Rodrik on Political Entrepreneurs

But ultimately, political entrepreneurs are the ones who arbitrage between academic ideas and political inefficiencies (p. 22).

That is form a paper by Dani Rodrik. The title is "When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, World Views, and Policy Innovations." A draft is here.

The abstract

The contemporary approach to political economy is built around vested interests – elites, lobbies, and rent-seeking groups which get their way at the expense of the general public. The role of ideas in shaping those interests is typically ignored or downplayed. Yet each of the three components of the standard optimization problem in political economy – preferences, constraints, and choice variables – rely on an implicit set of ideas. Once the manner in which ideas enter these frameworks is made explicit, a much richer and more convincing set of results can be obtained. In particular, new ideas about policy—or policy entrepreneurship—can exert an independent effect on equilibrium outcomes even in the absence of changes in the configuration of political power.

Rodrik comments on and cites the book Madmen, Intellectuals, and Academic Scribblers, by Edward Lopez & Wayne Leighton, which stimulated Rodrik to write the paper. 

On the sources of ideas and policy innovations he writes

Perhaps the single most important source of ideas and policy innovation are practices that prevail elsewhere. The fact that a policy has worked – or at least is perceived to have worked – somewhere can be a powerful reason to copy it. Social security privatization in Chile, microfinance in Bangladesh, conditional cash grants in Mexico, and special economic zones China are some examples of policy innovation that gained adherents around the world following implementation in their native settings. Much legal and regulatory reform in the developing world is modeled after existing models in North America or Western Europe. The appeal of “imported ideas” is clear. Ready‐made policies eliminate or reduce the cost of home‐grown innovation and experimentation. The perception of their success elsewhere can also act as a counterweight to powerful vested interests at home (p. 26). 

Reform in Police Activity and Crime (Israel)

From a paper by Itai Ater, Yehonatan Givati, and Oren Rigbi 

We examine the consequences of an organizational reform in Israel that transferred the responsibility for housing arrestees from the Police to the Prison Authority. Using the staggered introduction of the reform in different regions of the country, we document strong evidence that this organizational change led to an increase of 11 percent in the number of arrests and to a decrease of 4 percent in the number of reported crimes, with these effects concentrated in more minor crimes. The reform also led to a decrease in the quality of arrests, measured by the likelihood of being charged following an arrest. These findings are consistent with the idea that the reform externalized the cost of housing arrestees from the Police's perspective, and therefore led the Police to increase its activity against crime.

The authors explain

During the years 2007 and 2008 Israel undertook a large reform in the handling of arrestees and the management of jails. Prior to the reform, the Police was responsible for the transportation and the housing of arrestees. Arrestees were detained either in police stations or in jails that the Police operated and controlled. The Police was also responsible for transporting arrestees from jails to courts and back. When suspects were convicted, they were moved to prisons, which are controlled by the Prison Authority. Under the new arrangement, the Police was no longer responsible for housing arrestees or transporting them. Jail facilities were handed over ”as is” to the Prison Authority, and arrestees were no longer detained at police stations (except for a few hours). Twice a day, the Prison Authority’s transportation unit would pick up new arrestees from police stations and take them to jails or to courts. P. 6.

In general the reform has increased efficiency by allowing the police to focus more on crime persecution, and prison authorities on the management of arrests. The case shows that within the government  it is possible to pursue more actively division of labor an especialization. In the conclusions the authors talk about other areas where that kind of reform can be implemented, such as hospitals.