Corruption

This is a cmperhensive review of the recent literature on corruption and the road ahead. From the paper:

There is a large and growing empirical literature that studies the effect of efforts to fight corruption. For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) find that an increase in punishments for parking violations in New York City reduced the violations among the set of diplomats, who were most likely to violate the rules. Using experimental techniques, Olken (2007) finds that theft in road projects is greatly reduced by raising the probability of being caught. Banerjee et al. (2007) and Duflo et al. (2008) find that strengthening incentives reduces absenteeism. Using a natural experiment in Buenos Aires hospitals, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) find effects of both more stringent monitoring and higher wages on procurement prices.

HT: Mark Lee.