In this paper, I argue that drug enforcement in a source country does generate violence, where the latter is measured as rate of homicides or displacement per 100, 000 inhabitants. I use data on drugs from Colombia during the period 1999–2010 to test this hypothesis. I find that drug enforcement has two effects: first– and second–order effects. . . (p. 23).
. . . Colombian data show that there existed first– and second–order effects of drug enforcement in the period 1999 − 2010: my results indicate that the first–order effect is 0.98% for the homicide rate and 1.24% for the displacement rate in the period 1999-2010 and the second–order effect is 4.00% for the homicide rate and 0.16% for the displacement rate (p. 24).
As a final conclusion, I cannot claim that the military tactics are the best methods to completely control the existence of drugs in Colombia. Despite the strength gained by the Colombian army and police from “Plan Colombia”, there are still Colombians interested in participating in the production of cocaine. Given the existence of an international market providing these individuals with funds to fight back the central government’s security forces, the result is that more Colombians are dying every day for the war against drugs (p. 24).HT: Maximo Rossi