Argentina, Ecuador, and Greece: Sovereign defaults compared

Three sovereign defaults in the past decade have each inflicted losses of at least 70% on bondholders: Argentina, Ecuador, and now Greece. In each case, creditor rights and the rule of law were trampled, setting troubling precedents that are worrying investors involved in vulnerable European countries. In Argentina (in default since 2002), numerous arbitrary measures were taken that damaged the interests of investors; the debt relief that was demanded bore little relation to the country's capacity to pay; and court judgments and arbitral awards against the sovereign have been routinely ignored. Ecuador (2008-2009) stands as the clearest example of sovereign unwillingness to pay. Investors were blindsided, bullied, and then sacrificed as part of a personal and ideological vendetta on President Correa's part. Investor confidence in Greece was destroyed by persistently negative attitudes coming out of Berlin. The huge losses imposed on creditors were based on questionable estimates and judgments, and various troubling, expedient means were used to achieve the dubious ends. Chances are that the road to perdition for investors will soon be extended to some other capital in Europe.

That is from the informative article "Buenos Aires to Athens: The Road to Perdition" by Arturo C. Porzecanski.

Default

This paper examines how a country's weak institutions and polarized government can affect the likelihood of its default on sovereign debt. Using a data set of 90 countries, it shows that strong institutions are associated with fewer sovereign default crises. In addition, when institutions are weak, a more polarized government tends to default more often. To explain these findings, the author develops a model showing the dynamics between the quality of institutions, the level of government polarization and sovereign default risk. Countries default more often when they lack rules and strong institutions to curb the influence of powerful groups on government policies. That is because in a polarized government, each powerful group makes decisions without considering the impact on other groups. Simulations of the model show that more than half the cross-country variation in sovereign default frequencies can be explained by institutional quality and the degree of government polarization observed in the data.

That is form the new paper by Rong Qian, "Why Do Some Countries Default More Often than Others? The Role of Institutions."