Showing posts with label Price Discrimination. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Price Discrimination. Show all posts

Feb 27, 2014

Labor Market Discrimination in Lima, Peru: Evidence from a Field Experiment

From a paper by Francisco B. Galarza & Gustavo Yamada: 
Summary: We analyze labor discrimination in Peru, a fast-growing country where much anecdotal evidence suggests the presence of discriminatory practices in everyday life. Using surnames (indigenous/white) as a proxy for race, we sent 4820 fictitious CVs in response to 1205 real job vacancies for professional, technical, and unskilled jobs in Lima. Overall, whites receive more callbacks than indigenous applicants, and beautiful applicants receive more callbacks than homely-looking ones. The magnitude and significance of the racial and beauty gaps in callbacks substantially vary by job category. In particular, better looks only seem to matter in getting more callbacks for professional jobs.
An short interview with Francisco is here. 

I am currently reading this fascinating book by Uri Gneezy & John List. They talk extensively about field experiments, and one of the topics they cover is discrimination.
An insights from the book is that providing more information to the buyer reduces the price he pays - less informed costumers usually pay higher prices. Let's see how:

The authors give the example of a person who wants to buy a camera lens. In the first store he enters he asks for the best lens available for the camera he is carrying, and the seller suggests a specific lens and tells the price, around $700. As the buyer shops around he gathers more information about the lens he needs up to a point when he enters a store asking for the specific type (name and model) and the price asked is much lower, around $300. From the seller's perspective a more informed consumer knows the "true" price of a product. In short, a more informed consumer pays less, in general.

In the lens case the higher price the initial sellers wanted to charge was based on the consumer's degree of information only. The seller does not have any hard feelings towards the buyer. The seller just wanted to maximise profits. That is also the case when an airline charges higher prices for flight during week-days versus week-ends, passengers looking for flights during week-days have a less elastic demand, think for instance about company executives. Uri and Jhon call that economic discrimination, as opposed to animus-based discrimination.  

The policy implications for the two examples are different: in the case of the camera lens the implication is: provide more information to the buyer. In the case of the labor market in Peru is: if you are looking for a job and you are "homely-looking" or have an indigenous last name, provide less information about those characteristics to the possible employer. 

The implications of policy are different because in the first case we see the situation from the perspective of the buyer of the camera, who wants to pay a lower price. In the second case we might be seen the situation from the perspective of the job seeker, the labor seller, who wants to get paid a higher wage, or be hired. 

An implication of Francisco and Gustavo's paper is that providing less information to the buyer - the potential employer - can reduce discrimination, and that implication contrast with Uri and John's. Precisely because we are looking at the situation from different perspectives. 

Economic discrimination is generally accepted, because it is motivated by profits only - doctors, for example, practice it often. Non-economic discrimination, or animus-based, is not socially accepted because it might be motivated by feelings and prejudices. 

A draft of Francisco and Gustavo's paper is here. The field of field experiment is incredibly captivating.

Short reviews of The Why Axis are here and here.

Nov 28, 2013

Ethnic Discrimination: Lessons from the Israeli Online Market for Used Cars

Using a combination of randomised field experiments, follow-up telephone surveys and other data collection efforts, this article studies the extent and the sources of ethnic discrimination in the Israeli online market for used cars. We find robust evidence of discrimination against Arab buyers and sellers which, the analysis suggests, is motivated by ‘statistical’ rather than ‘taste’ considerations. We additionally find that Arab sellers manipulate their ethnic identity in the market by leaving the name field in their advertisements blank.
The abstract is from this paper (The Economic Journal, November 2013) by Asaf Zussman. Alas I did not find the an ungated version of the paper.  

Aug 15, 2013

Price Discrimination 2.0. Opaque Bookings

Imagine a customer attempting to book a room on a three–star hotel located in Downtown–Manhattan on January 14th. When using Hotwire.com, the consumer is presented with a list of hotels, one for each area–star pair, displaying room rates and hotel amenities (e.g. parking, fitness room, etc). The booking process and user interface mimics that of a transparent platform like Hotels.com. The key difference however is that hotels names are hidden from the buyer and only revealed after the booking has been paid. P. 3.
That is from this paper by Cossa & Tappata (June 2013). 

From the abstract:
Our results suggest that the opaque selling channel constitutes the main device used by hotels to segment demand and even replaced traditional segmentation strategies. On average, consumers obtain a 49 percent discount when booking through a fully opaque platform. This discount drops to 40 percent when the booking is done through a semi–opaque platform. As suggested by the theory, discounts are proportionally larger for high quality hotels.

Jan 15, 2013

What drives taxi drivers?

Wikimedia Commons 
We find that passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on detours of almost double length, while lack of information on the local tariff system increases the likelihood of manipulated bills by about fifteen percentage-points. Passengers’ income seems to have no effect on fraud.
From a new published paper by Balafoutas et al (The Review of Economic Studies, December, 2012). 

The authors explain:
 By letting a triple of passengers – each in a different role – ask for the same service at practically the same time we were able to control for a variety of unforeseeable factors, such as traffic jams. Given the data on the exact length of a route and the information on the local taxi tariff system, we have then been able to identify the amount of overcharging by charging more than justified by the chosen route.
And:
Overall, we have found that 46% of passengers were taken on detours that accounted for at least 5% of the shortest possible route. The overall average detour was 10%, or roughly 1.3 km of the average total length of 12.7 km. Overcharging through manipulating fares was observed in only 11% of possible cases. Recall that overcharging – once detected – is typically much easier to verify than overtreatment, because there are always possible excuses for taking a detour. Thus, the expected material costs of being detected (e.g., the risk of being fined or losing one’s license) are probably higher for a taxi driver in the overcharging than in the overtreatment dimension, making the latter more attractive.
We knew that all along, but it is interesting to see some numbers. 

The researchers use GPS technology.

My favorites are some taxi drivers in Ghana, who usually say they know the location of your destination, but after a long time they start asking pedestrians for directions. They are awesome!  

Oct 14, 2012

Price Discrimination in Airline Tickets

Using unique transaction data, we compare tickets on the same airline and route that are purchased on different days of the week, after controlling for the day of week of travel, the ticket restrictions, the demand characteristics of the flights, and the number of days in advance that the ticket is purchased. We find that fares are 5% lower when purchased on the weekend. We conjecture that this is a form of price discrimination. If airlines believe that weekend purchasers are more likely to be price-elastic leisure travelers, then they may offer lower prices on weekends when the mix of purchasing customers makes demand more price elastic.
Source.